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Abstract 
 
How do presidents in new democracies choose cabinet ministers to accomplish their policy goals? 
Contrary to existing studies explaining the partisan composition of the cabinet with institutional 
characteristics, such as formal authority, we argue that the broader political context surrounding 
the president's ability to control the legislature can affect cabinet partisanship. By analyzing 
original data on cabinet formation in all presidential systems in East Asia since democratization, 
we find that when presidents are more likely to be dominant in executive-legislative relations,  
they have less concern about legislative support and more leeway to focus on policy performance 
by appointing nonpartisan cabinet members. This analysis suggests that understanding cabinet 
partisanship requires a view of cabinet appointments as a trade-off between securing legislative 
support and managing policy performance, and the scope of this compromise depends on the 
strength of the president vis-à-vis the legislature.  
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The third wave of democratization followed the fall of powerful national leaders throughout East 
Asia in the 1980's and 90's. From the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986 to 
the 1999 end of Suharto's "New Order" in Indonesia, these authoritarian leaders gave way to 
more institutionally constrained successors (Whitehead 2014). Democratization with a series of 
constitutional reforms have tied presidents' hands, limiting their terms in office and compelling 
negotiation with legislatures that have been reinstated as a lawmaking institution representing the 
public will (Dalton, Shin, and Chu 2008). Presidents’ reform programs now require broad 
legislative support to enact them. In parallel, chief executives also need competent and 
trustworthy public employees who can perform to high standards to pursue their policy 
commitments. For these policy objectives, presidents in East Asian democracies have strong 
incentives to accommodate legislative interests in the government. Yet, parties in such new 
democracies are not as institutionalized as parties in developed democracies (Dalton, Chu, and 
Shin 2008; Tomsa and Ufen 2013) and tend to show limited capacity to recruit executive talent 
within the party organization (Samuels and Shugart 2014). Presidents will therefore have 
incentives to choose party-affiliated ministers when they aim to secure legislative support but 
may choose ministers beyond partisanship in order to manage policy performance.  
 There has been growing research on cabinet appointments in presidential democracies. 
However, there is still limited knowledge about how presidents form a cabinet, particularly in the 
East Asian context. In Latin America, where presidentialism is the central aspect of its 
constitutional history and the dominant line of comparative research on presidential cabinet 
formation has emerged, the conventional view has attributed cabinet composition to institutional 
characteristics, such as formal presidential authority, electoral rules, and party characteristics 
(Amorim Neto 2006; Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004; Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 
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2015). According to this literature, presidents who can enact bills unilaterally by decree powers 
form a cabinet with more nonpartisan members, while chief executives who have limited 
policymaking power include more partisan ministers in order to solidify support for their policy 
program (Amorim Neto 2006). When electoral rules or party characteristics allow presidents to 
effectively control their party, they are more likely to appoint copartisans versus nonpartisans to 
the cabinet (Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015).  
 Yet, as shown below, there has been wide variation over time in the degree to which 
presidential cabinets in East Asia represent partisanship of legislatures. In most countries, such 
variation is not caused by changes in the constitutional design or institutional features. When 
there was little change in formal presidential powers, rules electing national legislative members, 
or the degree of party institutionalization, we still observe significant variation in cabinets' party 
representation across and within administrations. For example, Taiwanese President Chen Shui-
bian handed multiple cabinet posts, including a premier position, to members of the opposition 
Nationalist Party during his first year in office, but his cabinet appointments included fewer 
opposition party members over time. In fact, Chen seemed to have more leverage over cabinet 
appointments during his second term (Wu 2005). 
 In light of this, what other factors can affect presidential behavior, particularly decisions 
to distribute top executive positions? Under what conditions are presidents pressured to seek 
coalitional support versus advantaged to appoint nonpartisan loyalists? We argue that 
presidential cabinet appointment decisions are influenced by the strategy for securing legislative 
support and the necessity to manage policy performance, and that chief executives’ ability to 
achieve these goals is determined by a set of political factors. We will focus on contextual 
factors, denoting important characteristics of presidential systems, such as presidential popularity 
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and the electoral calendar, because they are closely related to the ability of presidents to contain 
legislative strength. Moreover, the scope for the trade-off between seeking legislative support 
and managing policy performance can change as the bargaining dynamics in executive-
legislative relations vary over time. When presidents are more likely to be dominant in 
executive-legislative relations, they have less concern about legislative support and more leeway 
to focus on policy performance by appointing nonpartisan ministers. Our analysis therefore 
demonstrates that a clear understanding of cabinet partisanship requires a view of cabinet 
appointments as a trade-off between these two goals, and the scope of this compromise depends 
on the likelihood of a president's control over the legislature.  
 In describing the centrality of balancing the key governing goals with a president's 
cabinet appointments, we examine executive-legislative relations in 21 administrations of all 
presidential democracies in East Asia, namely Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and 
Taiwan, from the time of their recent democratization through 2013. Analysis of our original 
datasets shows that presidents are more likely to name nonpartisan ministers when they are in 
advantageous positions to control the relationship with the legislative branch, either through 
enjoying strong legislative support or the presidential honeymoon period. Presidents are more 
likely to concede cabinet posts to other legislative parties when they suffer minority legislative 
status or lose political momentum as the end of their term nears. We further find that presidents 
are more likely to assign key cabinet posts that are central to the management of a government's 
policy performance, such as economic management, foreign affairs, and national defense, to 
nonpartisans than other partisan members, after controlling for several political factors.  
 This article makes important contributions to the literature on comparative politics. First, 
we demonstrate that there are time-varying factors, other than formal authority and institutional 
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characteristics, which shape presidential ability to constrain legislative strength and their cabinet 
appointment decisions. The literature on the causes and consequences of the variation in cabinet 
partisanship within countries is still scarce (c.f., Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015). Second, we 
contribute new evidence to the literature by showing the different patterns of portfolio allocation 
between parliamentary and presidential democracies, particularly in key policy positions. In 
comparison with parliamentary democracies, where core cabinet posts are reserved for senior 
parliamentarians (Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss 2006), chief executives in presidential 
democracies tend to assign these posts to reliable agents even from outside the party, thereby 
managing the government's policy performance.  
 In the next section, we use a principal-agent perspective to discuss the nature of the trade-
off presidents face in obtaining the dual objectives through cabinet appointments. Then we 
outline our theoretical framework which emphasizes the president's situational control of the 
legislative branch. We suggest that certain contextual factors, such as presidential popularity 
among the electorate and the electoral calendar, can enhance or reduce the likelihood of 
presidential dominance in executive-legislative relations. After analyzing our hypotheses, we 
discuss our findings and draw conclusions regarding intra-administration variation in presidential 
legislative strength and their cabinet choices.    
 
President's Policy Goals, Agency Problems, and Cabinet Partisanship 
Presidents of new democracies face a range of political and policy challenges that may 
undermine the stability of their government (see e.g., Kasuya 2003; Kim 2011; Slater 2004; 
Timberman 1991 for the cases of East Asian democracies). They need to generate broad 
legislative support to effectively enact their reform program. On the other hand, presidents desire 
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to implement the policies promised in their electoral platforms as the ability to achieve their 
policy agenda is a necessary condition for a successful presidency (Mainwaring and Shugart 
1997). One typical way to obtain these dual objectives is through political appointments. 
Presidents appoint cabinet ministers and authorize them to work toward legislative consent and 
manage policy implementation. Yet, competing incentives exist in every administration when 
choosing ministers, because chief executives are not only constrained by the relative scarcity of 
top executive posts but also encounter delegation problems where appointees may differ in their 
ability and incentives to achieve the chief executive's goals (Huber and Martínez-Gallardo 2008; 
Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). 
 While the principal-agent relationship in parliamentary democracies is a single line of 
delegation from a prime minister to cabinet ministers, presidential democracies feature a more 
complicated delegation web as presidents compete with the legislature for the ministers' 
accountability (Strøm 2000). In presidential democracies, where chief executives and legislators 
are elected by a different set of constituents, the two branches tend to have diverging preferences 
over the direction of policy program (Samuels and Shugart 2010). Presidents serve and appeal to 
a single national electorate, but legislators serve and target local constituencies. Therefore, party-
affiliated ministers find themselves caught between the policy interests of two competing 
principals, the president and their party (Carey 2007; Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015; 
Samuels and Shugart 2010). Nonetheless, even with the potential risk of agency loss, the 
incentives and benefits of including opposition party members in cabinets are clear: strong 
legislative support helps presidents to succeed in policymaking (Cheibub 2007) and to survive 
impeachment threats (Pérez-Liñán 2007).1
                                                          
1 The legislative success rate on average is higher for presidents who are supported by a legislative majority than for 
those who are under minority support (Cheibub 2007). 
 The costs of bringing other party members into the 
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government are not modest, however. Presidents may have conflicts of interest with the ministers 
of other parties, but cannot simply dismiss them because their presence in the cabinet represents 
the government's legislative support from executive coalitions (Dowding and Dumont 2009).2
 How does the choice of nonpartisan ministers, then, help presidents handle agency 
behavior and manage policy performance? First, by naming nonpartisans, presidents can enjoy a 
higher degree of ministerial loyalty. In contrast to party-affiliated ministers whose preferences 
over the direction of policy agenda may diverge (Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015, Samuels 
and Shugart 2010), nonpartisans are generally perceived as loyalists – they are less likely to put 
their individual political ambition above the president's policy agenda and tend to stay outside 
politics after serving in the cabinet (Blondel 1991; Camp 2010). Moreover, by appointing 
nonpartisan ministers, presidents can take advantage of executive talent from an external pool 
and are not constrained by the limited talent available in new democracies' party organizations 
(Samuels and Shugart 2014). Professional backgrounds and technical skills are typical selection 
criteria in the recruitment of nonpartisan ministers (Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015). Therefore, 
the choice of nonpartisan ministers provides presidents with several advantages for managing 
their policy program. Nevertheless, the distribution of cabinet posts being substantially biased 
toward nonpartisans may leave chief executives vulnerable to challenges from the legislature. 
  
 This brings up the question of how presidents will choose the degree of partisanship in 
cabinets. Presidents will build coalitional support to the extent necessary to control the general 
political agenda but will also work to manage policy implementation by appointing nonpartisan 
loyalists insofar as they are able. The range of these choices, we argue, depends on the strength 
of the president vis-à-vis the legislature during their fixed terms. Under certain conditions – 
                                                          
2 Dismissing ministers representing coalition members without proper negotiations can be highly costly as in the 
case of President Abdurrahman Wahid of Indonesia who was impeached and removed from office (Slater 2004). 
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which will be listed in the next section – presidents can more easily obtain legislative support, 
and in those contexts, the marginal benefits of appointing nonpartisan ministers are greater. 
Cabinet formation is therefore a window to understand how presidents weigh the legislative 
gains from coalition formation and the administrative benefits of naming nonpartisan loyalists. 
The main concern of this article is to formulate and explain how cabinet appointments represent 
the variations in presidents' relative legislative strength during their terms.  
 
The Effect of Political Context on Executive Influence over Legislatures 
In presidential democracies, chief executives exert unilateral authority to appoint cabinet 
members and serve as de facto party leaders in the governmental arena regardless of their formal 
party leadership (Samuels and Shugart 2010). In East Asia, presidents can typically appoint and 
dismiss cabinet ministers by executive prerogative (Hicken and Kasuya 2003; Shugart and Carey 
1992). Presidents of Indonesia and South Korea maintain nearly exclusive control over cabinet 
formation since they can freely appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers without much legal 
constraint. Presidents of Taiwan have maintained substantial authority to appoint and dismiss 
cabinet members since the 1997 constitutional amendment resulting in a semi-presidential 
system wherein the president was granted exclusive power to appoint the premier who in turn 
appoints the rest of the cabinet with the president's consent. Presidents of the Philippines have 
the authority to name and direct the composition of the government and tend to have cabinets 
they want, as the formal process of legislative confirmation has often been passed over and a 
large number of appointees have served without a final confirmation. Presidents, rather than their 
parties, are central decision makers who negotiate with rival parties in the legislature over 
coalition formation.  
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 Presidents, we argue, are more likely to name nonpartisan ministers when their influence 
over the legislature is high but are more likely to seek to form coalitions in times of lesser 
executive sway over the legislature. The magnitude depends on a set of political factors 
signifying important characteristics of presidential systems: presidential popularity among the 
electorate and the electoral calendar as well as the president's support in the legislature and the 
intensity of legislative challenges against the president. These contextual factors have a powerful 
and systematic impact on the president's political momentum and are closely related to the 
relative strength of presidents and the legislature.  
 
Legislative Support, Opposition Challenges, Presidential Popularity, and Electoral Cycle  
There is scholarly consensus that Latin American presidents frequently form government 
coalitions in order to secure legislative support and govern effectively (Altman 2000; Amorim 
Neto 2006; Chaisty, Cheeseman, and Power 2014; Geddes 1994; Raile, Pereira, and Power 2011). 
Presidents serve fixed terms independently of their legislative support, but they still bargain with 
the legislature to "form and change government coalitions" as a formateur (Cheibub 2007, 53). 
Presidents have particularly strong incentives to pursue coalition formation when their party is in 
the minority and they face opposition majorities in the legislature, because their effectiveness is 
severely limited in such circumstances (Carey 1997).  
 The experience of South Korea's President Kim Dae-jung illustrates this strategy. In 1998, 
when Kim took office, his legislative party, the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP), 
accounted for 26.3 percent of the members of the National Assembly, while the opposition 
Grand National Party (GNP) held a majority of 54 percent. Before long, Kim formed a coalition 
with the conservative United Liberal Democrats (ULD) by allocating a third of cabinet seats to 
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his coalition partner, including a prime minister position.3
Hypothesis 1: When the president's support in the legislature decreases, the 
president is more likely to appoint ministers of other parties.   
 From this discussion, we propose the 
following hypothesis and conduct its first empirical test in the context of East Asian multiparty 
presidential democracies. 
 
 
 
 The extent to which presidents can control the political agenda also depends on the 
intensity of the legislative opposition as well as the strength of the president's own party. In 
multiparty systems, presidents tend to more easily control their political agenda as long as no 
single party commands an opposition majority in the legislature. In the context where no party 
has an opposition majority on its own, multiple parties need to coordinate to check presidents 
and their political agendas. However, it is not easy for these parties to cooperate against the 
president due to the advantages of the executive branch’s resources. With these advantages, 
presidents are in a better position to induce cooperation from other parties, confounding 
opposition efforts to form a coalition against the government.  
 The more fragmented the legislature, the easier it is for the president to obtain legislative 
support without conceding cabinet seats. In a multiparty system where no party commands a 
majority, the presidential capacity to dictate the political agenda is relatively high, because there 
are always minor parties who are willing to cooperate with the president to boost their political 
leverage (Altman 2000; Strøm 1990; Zucco 2009).4
                                                          
3 For details of cabinet appointments in the South Korean context, see Hahm, Jung, and Lee (2013). 
 Moreover, in the new democracies of East 
Asia, often characterized by their "pragmatic" parties who compete based on clientelism (Dalton, 
4 In presidential systems, the behavior of political parties is largely driven by their chances of victory in the 
executive election because the most important electoral prize for parties is the chief executive post. However, not 
every party will contend for the executive election, and those who cannot compete would rather lend their support to 
a candidate from other major contending parties. In multiparty systems, small parties that have a lower chance to 
win are likely to support large parties in exchange for their access to pork or policy concessions once their partners 
win. This logic can be also applied to the governmental arena (see Samuels 2002). 
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Chu, and Shin 2008, 2), small parties may "hire out" their support to the president in return for 
political benefits, such as pork or policy concessions (Kellam 2015). This line of logic leads to 
the second hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Facing more fragmentation in the legislative opposition, the 
president is more likely to appoint nonpartisan ministers. 
 
 
 
 For presidents who are directly elected by the public and govern with a national mandate, 
public approval creates room to exercise their prerogative. Presidents often "go public" as a 
strategy to enhance their chances of success in the policymaking process and having a decent 
level of popularity helps them in the actual practice of this strategy (Kernell 2007). Popular 
presidents who can directly appeal to voters by going over the heads of legislators have para-
constitutional prerogatives (Amorim Neto 2006, 416). Strong popularity grants presidents an 
increased ability to persuade the legislature and to impose costs for noncompliance (Kernell 
2007; Neustadt 1990). Even when presidents face sharp disagreement from the legislature under 
divided government, strong popularity makes their public appeals an effective strategy as it may 
damage legislators who oppose them (Kernell 2007). Actions that attempt to undermine the 
authority of presidents who are strongly backed by national constituents can be costly to the 
immediate political fate of legislators engaging in such behavior. In these cases, public prestige 
confers leeway and more discretion over appointments so that presidents can exercise their 
preferences in cabinet formation. This line of argument leads to the third hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Stronger popularity increases the share of nonpartisan ministers in 
presidential cabinets. 
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 In presidential systems where the next election date is common knowledge from the first 
day of a national mandate, the political dynamics in executive-legislative relations are shaped by 
the fixed electoral calendar and shift over the course of the president's term (Altman 2000). At 
the outset of the term, fate tends to be particularly favorable to newly elected presidents who 
enjoy the presidential honeymoon (Shugart and Carey 1992). But their fortunes start fading 
during the midterm and lose momentum even more quickly as they become lame-duck presidents 
near the end of their terms. Discretionary power that presidents can enjoy at their inauguration is 
likely to wane over time. In sum, the political momentum derived from the electoral calendar 
tends to give more discretion to presidents in decision-making as much of the public and media 
will be sympathetic to their decisions. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is that: 
Hypothesis 4: Presidents in the honeymoon period are more likely to appoint 
nonpartisan ministers than lame-duck presidents. 
 
 
 Based on our theoretical framework, we see distinct incentives exist in presidencies when 
selecting ministers and also when allocating cabinet posts. If presidential choice of nonpartisans 
signals their commitment to effectively delivering policy promises, most important policy 
positions, such as finance, national defense, or foreign affairs, will be assigned to reliable and 
competent agents since managing these areas directly determines the administration's fate and 
legacy. Cabinets would be unreasonably organized if presidents gave prime seats to other party 
members whose preferences may diverge from their policy agenda. We therefore predict that 
presidents are more likely to give key policy posts to nonpartisan loyalists than other partisan 
members. 
 In forming a cabinet, demand-side incentives also exist and are related to the types of 
ministries allocated as well as political contexts, such as presidential popularity and the electoral 
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cycle. Gaining access to executive resources should be attractive to the parties in the legislature, 
but how they actually value these resources may vary according to the particular cabinet post and 
broader political environment (Altman 2000; Martinez-Gallardo 2012). In this article, we assume 
that small parties in multiparty systems that cannot usually contend for the office of the chief 
executive are likely to accept the proposed posts. With little choice, they are better off doing so 
and getting access to executive resources than staying outside government and getting nothing 
(Samuels 2002). 
 
Data and Method  
In order to test these hypotheses, we constructed an original dataset of cabinet partisanship from 
all major presidential democracies in East Asia through the following steps. Drawing on the CIA 
Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments and the Political 
Handbook of the World, we first recorded the composition of the cabinets with a list of 
individual ministers for each country on a yearly basis. Then we collected information on the 
party affiliations and political backgrounds of ministers from multiple sources including 
academic publications, local archives, news reports, and websites in order to compile a yearly-
level dataset on cabinet partisanship in each country. 5  The cases and the respective years 
included are twenty-one administrations from Indonesia (1999-2013), the Philippines (1986-
2013), South Korea (1988-2013), and Taiwan (1993-2013).6
 The dependent variable is the share of nonpartisan ministers, ranging from 0 to 1, in the 
cabinet where appointment decisions take into account overall cabinet formation. We used the 
organization chart described on the official government websites of each country to determine 
  
                                                          
5 See online appendix for a list of sources. 
6 The Polity score, which lists a political regime ranging from 6 to 10 as "democracy", is used to determine the 
respective beginning year of democracy for these cases. 
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the size of the cabinet. Included are all departments or ministries in the executive branch whose 
heads are appointed and dismissed by presidential authority. Following the definition from the 
literature (e.g., Amorim Neto 2006), ministers not affiliated with any political party at the time of 
their appointment are listed as nonpartisan cabinet members.  
 Figure 1 describes two major features of presidential cabinets in four East Asian 
democracies. The vertical axis for each country indicates the proportion of 1) cabinet posts given 
to nonpartisan ministers vis-à-vis other party members for the horizontal dotted lines; and 2) 
portfolio reallocation through cabinet reshuffles for the vertical spikes. In any given month, if 
presidents replaced their ministers, there is a short or a long vertical spike depending on the 
magnitude of cabinet reshuffles. The horizontal axis for each country names the president in 
office at the time indicated. We can observe that in most administrations of each country, 
presidents did make substantial changes in the partisanship of their cabinets through frequent 
reshuffles. 35 percent of the ministers in our sample serve less than a year.7
 
 These changes 
illustrate great variations across and within countries. On average, the cross-country variation 
ranges from a low of 41 percent (Indonesia) to a high of 70 percent (Philippines), while the 
largest within-country variation, recorded in South Korea, ranges from a low of 27 percent to a 
high of 95 percent. It is also notable that these changes occur during the presidential terms 
without new executive elections.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
                                                          
7 Frequent reshuffles may help to manage policy performance as cabinet reshuffles can be pursued as solutions to 
adverse selection problems when ministerial drift is detected (Indridason and Kam 2008). 
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Explanatory variables. To test the four hypotheses about the effects of the president's relative 
legislative power on cabinet partisanship, we adopt and specify four independent variables. First, 
as a measure of presidents' support in legislature, we use the proportion of seats occupied by the 
president's party in the lower or only chamber. In the new democracies of East Asia, legislative 
composition frequently changes between legislative elections due to party switching, merging, 
splitting, or by-elections occurring (e.g., Fell 2014; Kasuya 2008; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). 
We therefore use a continuous measure to better capture the nuanced difference in a president's 
partisan strength, particularly within the range below 50 percent, in multiparty systems. We 
predict a positive relationship between presidents' support in legislature and the share of 
nonpartisan ministers (H1). Second, a measure of opposition fragmentation is constructed based 
on Laakso and Taagepera's index (1979) to weight the number of opposition parties by their 
proportion in the legislature. 8
 Third, presidential popularity is a measure of the incumbent president's popularity among 
the electorate. To estimate this measure, we use presidential approval ratings from monthly 
public opinion surveys conducted nationwide in each country. The variable, ranging from 0 to 1, 
is the aggregate proportion of respondents who answered "very satisfied" and "somewhat 
satisfied" to the following survey question: "How satisfied or dissatisfied you are in the 
performance of (name) as President of (country)?" We expect a positive relationship between 
presidential popularity and the share of nonpartisan ministers (H3). Fourth, electoral cycle is a 
 Higher values on this measure indicate more fragmented 
opposition and less intensive challenges against the president. We thus predict a positive 
relationship between opposition fragmentation and the share of nonpartisan ministers (H2). 
                                                          
8 The measure is calculated using the function 1
∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1
 where n is the number of all parties but the president's party 
holding at least one seat in the lower or only chamber, and 𝑝𝑖  is the seat share of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ party in the legislature. To 
handle the cases of independent members and minor parties grouped into others, we employ the scheme developed 
by Mainwaring and Zoco (2007, 173). 
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measure of the fixed electoral calendar during the president's term. We include a continuous 
variable which indicates the number of months left until the end of the fixed term. We also 
expect a positive relationship between electoral cycle and the share of nonpartisan ministers (H4). 
 
Control variables. We control for five variables that are likely to influence cabinet partisanship. 
First, constitutional power measures formal powers granted to the president. It is a common 
parameter of presidential power and likely to have a positive impact on nonpartisan 
appointments (Amorim Neto 2006). We adopt the classification by Shugart and Carey (1992) 
and apply their ordinal scales to information from these countries' constitutions and other 
academic sources.9
                                                          
9 The classification by Shugart and Carey divides the formal powers into two categories – legislative and non-
legislative powers – which have multiple types of powers within each category. The overall measure is the sum of 
the individual scores (ranging from 0 to 4) of each subtype of powers within the two categories. The measure ranges 
from 9 (Indonesia) to 21.5 (South Korea). 
 The second control variable, term limit, measures whether a president can run 
for re-election or not. This is a dichotomous variable that gives a value of 1 if a president can 
seek re-election and 0 otherwise. It is likely that presidents who can seek re-election will choose 
cabinet partisanship differently from those who are term-limited. Third, organized legislative 
committees composed of experienced and professionalized members can effectively oppose the 
president and the ruling party in policy making and possibly influence cabinet formation. We 
thus control for legislative professionalization measuring the incumbency retention rate in the 
lower chamber of the legislature (Shair-Rosenfield and Stoyan 2017). Fourth, it is possible that 
presidents may rely on the policy expertise of nonpartisan ministers, particularly when facing an 
economic crisis. To address this possibility, we control for inflation using the monthly change in 
the consumer price index. Fifth, as new democracies with an immature party system may be 
"more conducive to non-partisanship in the cabinet" (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006, 639), we 
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control for age of democracy, which is the number of years since the country’s democratic 
transition. Lastly, the nature of cabinet reform and minister turnover may affect the likelihood of 
nonpartisan appointments. To control for this effect, we include cabinet reshuffle, a measure of 
the magnitude of cabinet reshuffling, which is the proportion of cabinet seats replaced in a given 
year. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all independent and control variables. Data 
sources for these variables are included in the online appendix. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Model choice. To estimate the share of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet, we employ extended 
beta-binomial models with country fixed effects. These models are widely used to estimate 
cabinet partisanship for proportion data that are obtained from a series of binary choices 
normally dependent of each other (e.g., Amorim Neto, 2006; Amorim Neto and Strøm, 2006; 
King 1998; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2010). The estimation of fixed effects will account for 
unobserved country-level heterogeneity and address potential serial correlation. Given the time-
series cross-sectional structure of the dataset, we estimate heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors that are robust to general forms of spatial and temporal dependence 
(Driscoll and Kraay 1998).10
 In addition, for further analysis concerning allocation of cabinet portfolios, we use 
logistic regression models with individual-level data which include 778 ministers across the four 
East Asian democracies from 1986 to 2013. In these additional models, our dependent variable is 
whether ministers are nonpartisan (coded 1 if ministers are nonpartisan; 0 if ministers are from 
  
                                                          
10 The models estimating Newey and West standard errors, which permit heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up 
to some lag (Newey and West 1987), produced qualitatively similar results.  
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other legislative parties), and our main independent variable measures whether cabinet posts 
belong to key policy areas (coded 1 if portfolios are key policy posts; 0 otherwise). Following 
the literature (e.g., Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss 2006), we classified finance, foreign affairs, 
national defense, internal affairs, and legal affairs as key areas. We employ country-level fixed 
effects for this analysis and estimate robust standard errors clustered on each country.  
 
Findings. Table 2 presents the results of our analysis. Models 1 and 2 test the proposed 
hypotheses with control variables included only in Model 2. In Model 3, we run the same 
analysis with directly-elected presidents only as robustness checks. All models include country-
level fixed effects. In Model 2, presidents' support in legislature positively influences 
presidential decisions to appoint nonpartisan ministers and negatively affects the likelihood of 
executive coalition formation (H1). We also confirm that a positive relationship exists between 
electoral cycle and the share of nonpartisan ministers (H4). However, the results do not lend 
strong support to our second and third hypotheses. Specific results are discussed below. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 The coefficient of presidents' support in legislature is positive and statistically significant 
(H1). Based on the estimation of Model 2, a decrease in presidents' support in legislature from 
its observed maximum to minimum values leads to the appointment of seven additional ministers 
from other legislative parties on average (25.7 percent of the average size of the cabinet), holding 
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all other variables constant at their means.11
 Consider the example of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for the effect 
of the president's legislative support. His choice of vice presidential candidates, one of the most 
important future cabinet members, for two presidential elections was a stark contrast. In 2004, 
when Yudhoyono's Partai Demokrat (PD) took only ten percent of legislative seats, his choice of 
a vice presidential candidate was Jusuf Kalla, who held a strong political base in the largest party 
(Partai Golongan Karya) of the Indonesian parliament (Horowitz 2013). In 2009, when the PD 
became the largest party in the Indonesian parliament, the incumbent president replaced Kalla 
with Boediono, a former central bank governor and university lecturer who had no strong 
political base (Horowitz 2013). The increased strength of his legislative power put Yudhoyono in 
a favorable position with more leverage to exercise his preferences in these choices.
 This finding suggests that presidents are more likely 
to form coalitions and less likely to appoint nonpartisan ministers as their parties lose legislative 
seats. Consistent with the literature, a president's copartisan support is indeed an important 
source of leverage in the appointment process, which determines presidential incentives for 
coalition formation (Cheibub 2007).  
12
 In Model 2, electoral cycle has a positive and statistically significant effect on the share 
of nonpartisans in the cabinet (H4). From the estimation of Model 2, presidents who are at the 
beginning of their term average three more nonpartisan ministers in comparison with lame-duck 
presidents (11 percent of the average cabinet size), holding all other variables constant at their 
 
                                                          
11 The average size of the cabinet is 27.25 which is based on the size of the cabinet formed at the outset of the term 
in the most recent administrations, as of 2013, from four Asian democracies: Indonesia (35), the Philippines (23), 
South Korea (17), and Taiwan (34). 
12 The new electoral rules of Indonesia require the president-vice president ticket to garner either 25 percent of 
legislative votes or 20 percent of legislative seats for eligible candidacy. In 2009, the PD won 26.4 percent of 
legislative seats in the April general election (Horowitz 2013, 192-198). 
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means. For newly elected presidents, the political momentum gained from the electoral calendar 
gives more leeway to exert their preferences in cabinet selection.  
 The results from the model specifications in Table 2, however, do not support our 
expectations regarding opposition fragmentation. In contrast to our prediction that more 
fragmented legislative opposition allows more nonpartisan appointments (H2), the effect of 
opposition fragmentation is not statistically significant. Yet, further looking into this variable, we 
find that opposition fragmentation has a positive (.007) and statistically significant (p < .05) 
effect on the share of nonpartisan ministers, interacting with presidents' support in legislature. 
This finding suggests that opposition fragmentation matters in presidential cabinet choices, but 
its effect is conditional on the legislative status of the president's party. At the observed 
minimum value of presidents' support in legislature, a change in opposition fragmentation from 
its minimum to mean values means presidents are likely to include 2.4 additional nonpartisan 
ministers on average (nine percent of the average size of the cabinet), holding all others constant. 
This finding is in line with Mejía Acosta's (2009) study of Latin American democracies, where 
minority presidents may appoint many nonpartisan ministers when facing a fragmented 
opposition in the legislature. 
 The results from the model specifications in Table 2 also do not support our predictions 
regarding presidential popularity. In contrast to our expectation that more popular presidents will 
appoint more nonpartisan ministers (H3), the effect of presidential popularity is negative and 
statistically significant in Model 1 and loses statistical significance with controls included in 
Model 2. Based on the estimation of Model 1, an increase in presidential popularity from its 
observed minimum to mean values leads to the appointment of 1.5 fewer nonpartisan ministers 
on average (5.5 percent of the average size of the cabinet), holding all others constant. One 
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possible account for this paradoxical finding could be that popular presidents still seek additional 
political support when administering a minority government, as they learn lessons from history. 
In the history of East Asian democracies, majority presidents who suffered low public approval 
still stayed in power, as in the cases of Presidents Lee Myung-bak of South Korea and Ma Ying-
jeou of Taiwan, but minority presidents who maintained a respectable degree of popularity 
struggled in executive-legislative relations, as in the cases of Presidents Roh Moo-hyun of South 
Korea, Joseph Estrada of the Philippines, and Abdurrahman Wahid of Indonesia. Alternatively, 
public prestige helps chief executives to attract political cooperation from other parties who 
deem joining popular presidents' cabinets appealing, which may lead to rapid coalition formation 
(Altman 2000). The finding that presidential popularity still holds a negative (-.347) effect, 
interacting with presidents' support in legislature, is also in line with this explanation.  
 The six control variables tend to have the predicted effects, but only a few of the 
coefficients reach statistical significance. First, the effect of constitutional power is negative and 
statistically significant.13
                                                          
13 When country-level fixed effects were dropped, the coefficient was positive and not significant (0.027, p = .293). 
 Even though they are endowed with strong constitutional powers, chief 
executives without sufficient legislative support or facing more professionalized legislatures may 
struggle to have their agendas enacted (Mainwaring 1997; Shair-Rosenfield and Stoyan 2017), 
and, in this case, they might seek further support from the legislature through conceding cabinet 
seats. Second, we find that presidents who can seek re-election are less likely to choose 
nonpartisan ministers than those who are term-limited. The former leaders need to maintain 
stable executive-legislative relations to increase their chances for re-election, but the latter have 
no such incentive. Additionally, we find that presidential cabinets in Taiwan and Indonesia are 
less likely to include nonpartisans than presidential cabinets in South Korea. 
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 As a robustness check, Model 3 examines the same model specification as Model 2 but 
only includes directly-elected presidents by excluding indirectly-elected ones.14
 In Table 3, we present the results of our analysis regarding the allocation of cabinet 
portfolios. We test our prediction with control variables included only in Model 2; and in Model 
3, we check the robustness of our results by running the same analysis with directly-elected 
presidents only. Our sample of individual-level data shows 85.5% of ministers are nonpartisan 
and 14.5% of ministers are from other legislative parties. Roughly 28% of portfolios are in key 
policy posts. While 29.2% of nonpartisan ministers were assigned to these posts, 16.4% of other 
partisan ministers held such posts.  
 Here, we address 
potential concerns about unobserved factors that can call into question the causal relationship 
between the president's relative legislative power and cabinet partisanship; this could be a 
particular concern when presidents are not directly elected by voters but by an electoral college 
composed of legislative members. In such cases, presidents might be more likely to appoint 
nonpartisan ministers while being also more likely to hold the support of a legislative majority. 
The results in Table 2 confirm the robustness of our findings after excluding indirectly-elected 
presidents.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 In Model 2, we find that there is a positive relationship between key policy post and the 
choice of nonpartisan ministers. Based on the estimation of Model 2, nonpartisan ministers are 
2.6% more likely to receive key cabinet posts than other areas of posts, holding all other 
                                                          
14 Presidents Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) and Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-04) of Indonesia and President 
Lee Teng-hui (1993-1996) of Taiwan belong to the category of indirectly-elected presidents. 
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variables constant. This finding confirms our prediction that presidents will have distinct 
incentives when allocating cabinet posts and tend to appoint nonpartisan loyalists to important 
policy areas for the effective management of government performance. Our finding speaks to the 
comparative literature on portfolio allocation in democratic regimes and also has important 
implications for East Asian presidential democracies. In parliamentary democracies, chief 
executives tend to allocate key policy posts to senior parliamentarians who can develop a strong 
party label (Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss 2006). In contrast, chief executives in presidential 
democracies are willing to assign these posts to their loyal agents from outside the party, thereby 
managing the government's policy performance and overall political fate. Given the central roles 
ministers play in policy making and implementation, these different attributes not only affect the 
types of policies East Asian presidents choose but also influence the degree of accountability to 
constituents these policies represent. Finally, the results in Model 3 confirm our findings are 
mostly robust after excluding indirectly-elected presidents. 
 
Conclusion 
Scholars of new East Asian presidential democracies generally describe the chief executives as 
"imperial presidents" – powerful figures who have sources of authority beyond the constitution. 
While legislatures, as lawmaking institutions representing the public will, do have an ability to 
check the executive as evidenced by a series of recent presidential impeachments, the recent 
discussion of possible constitutional revisions in several presidential democracies in East Asia 
has brought scholarly and public attention to presidential prerogatives. 15
                                                          
15 For the recent discussion of constitutional reform in Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan, go to 
http://presidential-power.com/?p=2575. 
 In this article, we 
demonstrate that executive-legislative relations are affected by political contexts where the 
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bargaining dynamics between the two branches of government vary over time, and these 
contextual factors shape a president's cabinet appointment decisions. In forming a cabinet, 
presidents balance between securing legislative support and managing policy performance as the 
two central objectives. The scope for this trade-off depends on the president's relative legislative 
strength. When presidents are more likely to wield their influence over the legislature, namely 
through strong legislative support and the presidential honeymoon, they can obtain 
administrative benefits by naming nonpartisan loyalists. When they have a weaker position 
against the legislature, due to suffering minority legislative status and losing political momentum 
toward the end of their term, presidents can gain additional political support through conceding 
cabinet posts to other parties. Our unpredicted finding regarding the intensity of the legislative 
opposition indicates that it is still effective in shaping the president's power and cabinet choices, 
but such effect is conditional specifically on the legislative status of the president's party. Our 
opposite finding regarding presidential popularity among the electorate suggests that further 
research on the role of presidential popularity in cabinet formation is necessary. Logically, 
popular presidents should have more prerogatives that give them more discretion over 
appointments, but are possibly moderated by other political factors, including a president's 
legislative status as discussed above.  
 In analyzing the impact of political contexts on presidential cabinet appointment 
decisions, future research should seek to expand the scope of the dimension of cabinet choices to 
further understand the role of cabinet appointments in East Asian presidential democracies. 
Existing work casts some light on the linkage between the characteristics of party organization 
and copartisan appointments in presidential cabinets (Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015). Yet, 
the topics of whether the contextual factors we have described here will have a significant effect 
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on president-ruling party relations and make any difference in portfolio allocation to the 
president's own party members are largely unexplored. With party organizations becoming more 
institutionalized in East Asian democracies, we expect that presidents, who face more favorable 
political contexts, will be more likely to appoint copartisan ministers to develop a strong party 
label. In addition, given that significant variation exists in the stability of inter-party competition 
patterns in Asia (Hicken and Kuhonta 2015), exploring the degree of party system 
institutionalization as well as the characteristics of party organization should have important 
implications for cabinet choices in the intraparty dimension. 
 Additionally, some variation in cabinet appointment decisions could be driven by 
personal presidential characteristics not considered here. Public opinion is strongly favorable to 
political leaders who are willing to appoint technocrats or reformers to enhance policy 
performance, but it is often challenging to directly measure the characteristics that may affect 
both the predictor (popularity) and the outcome (nonpartisan appointments) of our analysis. In 
the East Asian context, there has been also scholarly attention to personal characteristics of 
presidents, some of whom are either too accommodative to legislative interests or too much of a 
maverick to negotiate, which might be relevant to consider in examining appointment styles. 
 Our analysis has important implications for the comparative literature. First, this article is 
a new endeavor to illuminate presidential leadership strategy to address key competing goals in 
governments and to explore how the chief executive's ability to achieve these goals in a given 
context affects cabinet partisanship. Despite the significant contribution of existing studies, an 
account of cabinet formation without a clear understanding of how presidents respond 
strategically to changing political contexts remains conceptually incomplete. We show that there 
is a set of time-varying factors that can affect presidential legislative strength and their cabinet 
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choices. Second, our findings call into question a main criticism of presidential democracies that 
separation of powers systems may adversely affect the quality of governance and democratic 
consolidation. Contrary to the argument that presidential democracies suffer weak incentives for 
executive-legislative cooperation and weak party representation in the cabinet (e.g., Linz 1990), 
recent work demonstrates the formation of government coalitions occurs frequently and helps to 
increase the chances of a president's legislative success (Cheibub 2007). By analyzing original 
data on the yearly observations of presidential cabinets in East Asian democracies, we contribute 
new evidence to the debate and speak to this recent literature: presidents actively form a coalition 
government for legislative support and limit party representation in the cabinet in specific 
contexts where they are more likely to control the legislature. Our analysis suggests that 
presidential cabinet appointments are therefore determined by their legislative strategy as well as 
their need to manage policy performance. This article, therefore, takes a significant step toward 
understanding of the role of cabinet appointments in the governance of presidential democracies 
in East Asia and beyond. 
 
Figure 1. Proportions of Nonpartisan Ministers and Cabinet Reshuffles, 21 Administrations from 
Four Presidential Democracies in East Asia 
 
Notes: The horizontal dotted lines for each country are the shares of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet. The 
vertical spikes for each country are the proportions of portfolio reallocation through cabinet reshuffles.  
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Figure 1. Proportions of Nonpartisan Ministers and Cabinet Reshuffles, 21 Administrations from Four Presidential Democracies in 
East Asia 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The horizontal dotted lines for each country are the shares of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet. The vertical spikes for each country are the proportions 
of portfolio reallocation through cabinet reshuffles.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables 
 
 N Mean SD Min Max Independent Variables      President's support in legislature 87 0.44 0.18 0.10 0.75 
Opposition fragmentation 87 16.69 21.12 3.7 97.56 
Presidential popularity 78 0.50 0.18 0.13 0.80 
Electoral cycle 88 36.12 18.09 1.35 71 
      Control  Variables      Constitutional power 88 17.32 4.27 9 21.5 
Term limit 80 0.2 0.40 0 1 
Legislative professionalization 81 0.48 0.14 0.17 0.74 
Inflation 88 4.77 3.59 -0.65 18.50 
Age of democracy 88 12.10 7.25 1 27 
Cabinet reshuffle 88 0.07 0.09 0 0.51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2. Political Context and Cabinet Partisanship: Extended Beta-binomial Models  
 
 Share of Nonpartisan Ministers 
 (1) (2) (3) 
(H1) President's support in legislature 2.113*** 1.835** 1.879** 
 (0.736) (0.908) (0.907) 
(H2) Opposition fragmentation -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
(H3) Presidential popularity -0.666** -0.038 -0.036 
 (0.301) (0.601) (0.598) 
(H4) Electoral cycle 0.009*** 0.007** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constitutional power  -0.293*** -0.296*** 
  (0.095) (0.093) 
Term limit  -0.282* -0.304* 
  (0.165) (0.156) 
Legislative professionalization  0.516 0.485 
  (0.737) (0.731) 
Inflation  0.007 0.006 
  (0.025) (0.024) 
Age of democracy  0.003 0.003 
  (0.015) (0.015) 
Cabinet reshuffle  -0.397 -0.844*** 
  (0.368) (0.315) 
Taiwan -0.171 -1.803*** -1.822*** 
 (0.127) (0.592) (0.580) 
Philippines 0.112 -0.661 -0.673 
 (0.332) (0.492) (0.488) 
Indonesia -0.596* -4.163*** -4.223*** 
 (0.338) (1.393) (1.376) 
Constant -0.122 5.769*** 5.848*** 
 (0.367) (1.880) (1.843) 
Log Likelihood 80.72 81.15 80.25 
Phi 27.768 30.384 30.476 
 (8.056) (9.957) (10.018) 
Observations 78 78 73 
Number of countries 4 4 4 
Notes: The unit of analysis is a country-year. The baseline category is South Korea. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3. Key Policy Posts and Choice of Nonpartisan Ministers: Logistic Regression Models 
 
 Choice of Nonpartisan Ministers 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Key policy post 0.954** 0.937** 1.076*** 
 (0.393) (0.405) (0.366) 
President's support in legislature 3.489** 4.298** 4.065** 
 (1.492) (1.770) (1.928) 
Opposition fragmentation 0.084* 0.124** 0.138 
 (0.044) (0.060) (0.093) 
Presidential popularity -1.783* -2.361 -2.293 
 (0.938) (1.636) (1.671) 
Electoral cycle 0.012 0.034** 0.036 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.030) 
Constitutional power  5.363*** 6.436*** 
  (0.270) (0.082) 
Term limit  0.651 0.578 
  (0.526) (1.293) 
Legislative professionalization  -2.948 -2.633 
  (3.038) (1.774) 
Inflation  -0.085 -0.080 
  (0.071) (0.149) 
Age of democracy  0.031 0.037 
  (0.063) (0.061) 
Cabinet reshuffle  -0.832 -0.909 
  (0.881) (1.285) 
Taiwan -0.292 33.73*** 40.79*** 
 (0.402) (1.515) (1.497) 
Philippines -1.120* 11.34*** 13.70*** 
 (0.616) (1.209) (1.953) 
Indonesia -2.098*** 64.15*** 77.55*** 
 (0.572) (3.335) (1.463) 
Constant 1.081 -113.3*** -136.7 
 (0.745) (6.203) (6.203) 
Log Likelihood -171.20 -163.21 -158.27 
Observations 670 644 627 
Number of countries 4 4 4 
Notes: The unit of analysis is a minister. The baseline category is South Korea. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
